Online daily-deal websites such as Groupon.com and LivingSocial.com have proven to be a novel price promotion tool for local merchants in geographic markets. Using sales data that we collected from Groupon.com, we investigate the effectiveness of this promotion tool by quantifying the impact of discount percentages on products or services sales. We have conducted multiple instrumental variable (IV) estimations, robustness tests, validation and falsification exercises, and concluded that a larger discount percentage leads to less product sales in daily-deal markets. Specifically, a 1% increase in a deal's discount percentage would decrease its sales by 0.0195% per hour. This effect is more prominent when the deal is credence goods, when it only accumulates few sales, or when the merchant is located at a wealthier or more educated city. Thus, the negative effect of discount percentages could a result of consumers' quality concerns; that is, a large discount percentage can become a warning signal of product quality to consumers. Our results have important managerial implications for both local merchants who participate in daily-deal websites and the daily-deal website owners.
Introduction
Price promotions account for a significant share of the marketing mix budget in many industries (Blattberg et al., 1995; Pauwels et al., 2002) . Growing phenomenally during the past several years, online daily-deal platforms have emerged as an innovative form of price promotion that allows local merchants to advertise their products or services to new customers through deep discounts. Daily-deal platforms are especially favorable to small-and medium-sized local businesses with limited marketing budget, because they do not pay upfront fees for running promotions but share a proportion (typically 50%) of the resultant revenue with the daily-deal platforms.
The effectiveness of a deal hinges crucially on how many new customers can be attracted by the discount. While discounts are often appealing to price-sensitive consumers, a large discount may also raise consumers' quality concerns, and therefore, dissuade purchases (Erdem et al., 2008) . Daily deal platforms are especially vulnerable to such negative impact of discount due to the high product uncertainty associated with online shopping (Overby and Jap, 2009 ). The spatial and temporal separation between buyers and sellers further intensifies the information asymmetry between the transacting parties in online markets (Ghose, 2009; Pavlou et al., 2007; Li et al., 2009) . Moreover, such quality concerns are exacerbated for experience and credence goods (Dimoka et al., 2012) , which represent the typical types of products and services offered on daily-deal platforms.
1
In this study, we investigate the impact of the depth of discount on consumers' demand in daily-deal markets.
2 By examining the demand side of a daily-deal platform, we will be able to offer important guidance to both daily-deal platforms and the participating 1 Experience goods are products that can be evaluated only after consumption (Nelson, 1970) ; Credence goods are products that are difficult or impossible to evaluate even after consumption (Darby and Karni, 1973) .
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Other decisions for a merchant to make include supplying quantity, duration of the deal, number of days until expiration after purchase and number of options for customers to choose from. merchants on how to effectively design a price promotion.
We have compiled a large panel data set from one of the leading firms in the dailydeal industry, Groupon.com, from January 8th, 2014 and March 31st, 2014. We have collected 19,978 deals covering a wide range of categories, from 172 cities in the United States and Canada. We recorded the sales information for each deal every hour, and reached a total of 1,835,794 observations.
As a summary of the findings, we first discovered a significant and negative effect of discount percentage on the sales that a deal can accumulate during each hour of its duration. To our best knowledge, we are the first to document such an immediate negative effect of discount on sales.
We further conducted two instrument variable (IV) estimation to address the potential endogeneity concern for discount percentage. Such concern may arise due to unobservable and omitted variables (e.g., a merchant's store location, environment, or reputation). Our first IV estimation followed the spirit of the BLP method that is commonly used to address endogeneity of prices in differentiated products markets (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2000; Berry and Haile, 2014) . Our second IV estimation used the average hourly wage (AHW) and the housing price index (HPI) for each deal's associated industry and local market as instruments.
The first IV test concluded that the negative effect of discount percentage on demand continue to hold in the Entertainment and Restaurants category. The second IV estimation also showed that the negative effect of discount depth survived with a marginal significance (p = 0.0998). Overall, these IV tests give us some confidence that the negative effect of discount is robust to the potential endogeneity concern caused by omitted variables.
A reasonable interpretation of the negative effect of discount is that consumers have increasing quality concerns for merchants offering deeper discounts. Several additional tests buttressed the above explanation. We first found that the negative effect of discount is more salient for credence goods than experience goods, since the former exhibit higher quality uncertainty. Second, we found that when a deal has already sells a large number of vouchers, it spurs less quality concern, possibly because popularity serves as a positive signal of product quality (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Moretti, 2011) . Lastly, we found that consumers in wealthier and more educated markets respond more negatively to deep discount. In addition to support the underlying mechanism for the negative effect of discount depth, these findings also have immediate and specific implications for managerial practice.
Related Literature
This study is closely related to the literature on price as a signal of unobservable product quality in economics and marketing. There is an extensive literature that have established the role of price as a credibly signal to quality in both monopolistic (e.g., Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) and oligopolistic settings (e.g., Wolinsky, 1983; Reinganum, 2007, 2008; Janssen and Roy, 2010) . The signaling effect of price arises with the presence of informed consumers, who are only willing to patron the high-quality sellers (who charge high price due to high production cost), and consequently, low-quality sellers find it optimal to set a low price due to its low production cost (Wolinsky, 1983; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) . In a more competitive market, even without informed consumers, prices are used as a competition tool among the sellers, which may lead to an equilibrium where high-quality products are sold at a higher price than low-quality products Reinganum, 2007, 2008; Janssen and Roy, 2010) .
Another prominent reason why price may function as a credible signal of quality is the repeat-purchase mechanism (Tirole, 1988) . Firms will maintain high quality because they can command a sufficiently large price premium from rational consumers that makes the discounted stream of rents on repeat sales outweigh immediate gains from cheating (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Rao and Monroe, 1996; Orosel and Zauner, 2011) .
Researchers from both Information Systems (IS) and economics have studied prod-uct uncertainties in online markets. Overby and Jap (2009) discovered that consumers are more likely to conduct transactions through electronic channels when the associated quality uncertainty is low. Consumers' quality concerns in online markets mainly arise from the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, which leads to both adverse selection issues, where buyers have limited capability to assess the quality of different sellers before purchase, and moral hazard issues where sellers intentionally misrepresent their product quality to online buyers (Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Jin and Kato, 2006; Pavlou et al., 2007; Ghose, 2009; Li et al., 2009; Dimoka et al., 2012) .
Several studies in marketing have discovered that frequent price promotions or "deals" may negatively affect brand sales in the long-run as consumers adjust their reference prices (Lattin and Bucklin, 1989) , increase price and promotion sensitivity (Mela et al., 1997) , engage in stockpiling behavior (Mela et al., 1998) , lower perception of brand image (Jedidi et al., 1999; Erdem et al., 2008) . Our results complemented this stream with a novel perspective: price promotions can even have an immediate negative effect because consumers hold increasing quality concerns for deeper discounts.
There have also been several empirical and theoretical studies on daily-deal websites (see, e.g., Jing and Xie, 2011; Hu et al., 2013; Shivendu and Zhang, 2013; Li and Wu, 2013; Subramanian and Rao, 2014; Wu et al., 2015) . To our best knowledge, we are the first to empirically study the impact of discounting depth on deal sales in daily-deal markets.
Background and Data

Overview of Daily-deal Websites and Groupon.com
Daily-deal websites represent a new e-commerce business model where merchants sell vouchers to consumers at a discounted price. A daily-deal website publishes multiple deals from different categories every day, and each deal can last several days.
Groupon.com, established in November 2008, was the first daily-deal website to focus on local businesses. By the second quarter of 2014, Groupon has operated in over 150 local markets in North America and over 100 markets in Europe, Asia and South America. The website has sold more than 600 million deals from over 650,000 merchants.
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Groupon thus holds a dominant position over its close rivals such as LivingSocial.com and Woot.com (Foresee, 2012) .
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Each deal on Groupon.com has its dedicated page to display all relevant deal information, such as descriptions of the deal and the merchant (in text and images), the original price, the discounted price, the discount percentage, the number of vouchers sold, terms of use, etc.. Some deals include the number of Facebook Fans and online reviews about the merchant from third-party websites, such as Yelp, Yahoo!, Google, etc., on their webpages.
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Data
We collected data about 19,992 completed deals from 8 January 2014 to 31 March 2014. Using a proprietary software, we scraped down a list of attributes from each deal's Groupon webpage, including a deal's original price, transaction price, discount percentage, number of days until the deal voucher expires after purchase, the maximum quantity allowed to be purchased per occasion, the number of different purchase options, detailed terms of use specified by the merchant under the "Fine Print" section, and if available, the number of Facebook fans, review quotes from third-party websites, as well as the volume and valence of the reviews. We monitored each deal's sales every hour, using the Groupon Application Programming Interface (API). We also knew through 3 Source. https://www.grouponworks.com/benefits-of-advertising-with-groupon.
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The field survey conducted by Foresee in 2012 showed that 60% of online visitors to the top 40 websites enrolled in at least one daily deal email program. Among the respondents, 52% used Groupon while only 30% used LivingSocial and 9% Woot.
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Please see Figure A .1 in the appendix for a screenshot of a typical deal page.
6
In the early days, merchants typically required a minimum number of purchases to "tip" a deal. Such threshold requirement is no longer in use in Groupon, and our data shows that all merchants specify a zero tipping point. See Wu et al. (2015) for an empirical analysis of the threshold effect on consumers' communication behaviors.
Groupon API: (i) whether a deal webpage was created by Groupon or by the merchant using Groupon's deal-building tool; and (ii) whether or when a deal was sold out before the end of its preset duration.
Our data has two limitations. First, when the number of vouchers sold is between 10 and 1,000, the API will round down the number to the closest multiple of 10, instead of reporting the actual number.
7 Second, when the number of vouchers sold is above 1,000, Groupon API will not report any update in sales before it reaches 5,000. The first limitation may not change our result dramatically because our whole data are trimmed by Groupon API in the same fashion. To address the second limitation, we dropped 14 deals with over 1,000 sales, resulting in 19,978 deals for the analysis. For example, 89 is reported as 80 and 101 is reported as 100. Subramanian and Rao (2014) also had a similar observation on this problem. subcategory in our data with one (and only one) industry code in the BLS data.
9 We also gathered from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA, fhfa.gov) the U.S. monthly house price index (HPI) in the nine census divisions for the 1st quarter of 2014. Each deal in our data was matched with an HPI value based on the starting date of the deal and the location of the merchant. ** Table 2 . Summary statistics ** ** Table 3 . Correlations ** Figure 1 plots the empirical distribution of the focal decision variable -discount percentage. Clearly, the discount depths in our data exhibit substantial variation, with the mode of discount depth being 50%. It bears noting that the majority of the merchants offered at least 30% discount off. ** Figure 1 . Distribution of discount percentage in the data **
Model and Results
We first supply an overview of the data in BLS uses the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in this data. For more details on the implementation of NAICS in BLS, readers are referred to http://www.bls.gov/bls/naics.htm.
10 Note that, for both panels, we have dropped deals whose discount percentage is below the 5th percentile due to limited number of observations. In addition, in Panel (b) we have excluded deals with duration below the 20th percentile or above the 80th percentile to avoid potential confounding influences by a deal's duration on its accumulated sales.
Our main econometric model is of the following specification:
where S ijt is the sales for deal i from market j during hour t; discount i is the discount percentage that deal i offers off the original price; price i is deal i's transaction (discounted) price; CS ij,t−1 is deal i's cumulative sales from hour 0 to t − 1; X i is a set of control attributes for deal i, included subcategory-fixed effects; γ j represents city-specific effects;
and τ t captures hour-specific effects. We specified all variables except dummies and the average online review ratings in logarithms.
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We first fitted Equation (1) to the whole data by excluding the volume and average rating of third-party online reviews in X i , due to large number of missing values on the two variables. As reported in Table 4 , Column (1), the estimates, except that of discount percentage, are largely consistent with our expectations. For example, consumers generally have less demand for high-priced goods; Quantity sold up to the previous hour is significantly and positively correlated with quantity sold in the current period. The most surprising finding, and also the focus of this study, is that the coefficient of discount percentage, −0.0195 (p < 0.01), is negative and very precisely estimated. Accordingly, a 1% increase in a deal's discount percentage decreased its sales quantity by 0.0195% per hour.
When we estimated Equation (1) using the subsample consisting of deals whose webpages displayed third-party online review information (about one third), the coefficient of discount percentage, −0.03 (p < 0.01), has a even larger magnitude and is still highly significant (Table 4 , Column (2)). We also estimated Equation (1) separately in each of the three major categories: Entertainment, Beauty and Spas, and Restaurants.
Column (3) - (5) in Table 4 report the estimates respectively. The results largely remain 11 As appropriate, we added one to the variable to avoid logarithms of zeroes.
consistent, except that in the Beauty and Spas category the negative effect of discount percentage became insignificant, −0.0186 (p = 0.20).
** Table 4 . The negative effect of discount depth **
We then conducted two IV estimations to address the potential endogeneity of discount decisions. Our first IV estimation borrowed from literature on identification of demand in differentiated products markets (e.g., Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2000; Berry and Haile, 2014 ). So we focused in the Restaurant and Entertainment category, which each could be treated as a differentiated products market. We then defined a focal deal's competing products as those same-category deals that were offered by other merchants located in the same city and that preceded or coincided with the focal deal in opening time. We treated all other deal attributes except sales quantity, transaction price, and discount percentage as exogenous characteristics, then instruments for deal i's discount percentage include (i) all exogenous variables of product i itself; and (ii) the sum of exogenous variables of all product i's competing products (Berry et al., 1995; Hui, 2004) . The intuition for these instruments can be obtained from a typical oligopoly pricing model: products tend to have low markups and thus low prices (large discounts in the Groupon setting) if they face good substitutes, and vice versa. Column 1 and Column 2 in Table 5 reported this IV estimation in each of the two categories. The price coefficients are negative and significant in both cases, and the values drop substantially compared to OLS estimates in Table 4 , which are consistent with previous findings (e.g., Berry et al., 1995; Hui, 2004) . More important, discount depth still has a significant and negative effect in both categories.
Our second IV test used the industry-specific average hourly wage (AHW), which varied across time and subcategories, and monthly house price index (HPI), which varied across time and across the nine U.S. census divisions, as instruments. We hope AHW an HPI can to some extent reflect variations in merchants' operation costs, which are supposed to directly related to their discount decisions. The first-stage regression results
show that both AHW and HPI are negatively and significantly correlated with discount percentage, confirming our intuition. More importantly, the second-stage regression results reported in Table 5 , Column 3 show that there is still a marginally significant negative effect of the discount percentage (−0.0609, p < 0.10).
Underlying Mechanism
What explains this finding? We argue that consumers are quite concerned about the product or service's quality eventually delivered to them by the seller when they purchase a deal on Groupon. Deep discounts exacerbate their such concerns or worries.
Consumers may believe high-quality sellers will generally choose lower discounts because (i) high-quality products are probably more costly to produce, so lower discounts can save more costs for high-quality sellers (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) , (ii) lower discounts are more likely to guarantee that sellers will not cut quality (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983) , and/or (iii) high-quality sellers might have a large base of informed customers who know the sellers' quality well (e.g., previous offline customers) and through whom product information spreads. We next applied a battery of additional identification strategies that scrutinized the heterogeneity of discount effect to support our arguments.
Experience vs. Credence Goods. We first estimated a model where the effect of discount depth was allowed to vary depending on whether the product is classified as a experience good (Nelson, 1970) or credence good (Darby and Karni, 1973) . Unlike experience goods whose utilities are known costlessly after consumption, credence goods' qualities are expensive or impossible for consumers to judge even after purchase. Typical examples of credence goods that have received much attention in the literature are medical treatments, automotive repair services, home repair services and other kinds of expert services (e.g., Darby and Karni, 1973; Emons, 1997; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006) .
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If quality concern is indeed behind the negative discount effect we found, we should expect that this negative effect is more severe for credence goods.
We added an interaction between discount depth and the dummy that indicates whether a deal is credence goods in the regression:
Note that the main effect of credence is taken out by the subcategory-fixed effects and so cannot be separately estimated. The estimates from this model are reported in Table 5 , Column 4. The coefficient of the interaction term credence×discount, β C 1 , has a negative and significant estimate, −0.0488 (p < 0.05), implying that discounts significantly hurt more severely the sales of credence goods. This is matched with our a priori expectation. ** Table 5 . Identification tests ** Deal Popularity. Popularity is often an information source consumers resort to in resolving quality uncertainties because a person might infer the value of the product from the number of other people who have purchased the product (Bikhchandani et al., 1998) . This implies that when a deal's sales volume is large enough, prospective consumers may have less worries about the product quality. Besides observational learning by prospective consumers, larger existing buyer base may also increase the likelihood of a deal receiving more buzz on social networking sites or physical social occasions, which may also help reduce the concerns or uncertainties prospective consumers have about the product quality (Moretti, 2011) .
In line with this logic, we estimated a model of the following form:
where salesAboveT hreshold it is a dummy to indicate whether deal i's sales volume exceeds a certain threshold before hour t starts. For estimates from this specification reported in Table 5 , Column 5, we chose the threshold to be 300. 13 As our above arguments predict, the estimate of β P 1 is positive and significant (0.0463, p < 0.01). Therefore, the negative effect of discount percentage is significantly smaller in magnitude when a deal's sales volume exceeds 300.
Income and Education Effect. We also exploited variations in the average levels of socioeconomic status (SES) across geographic regions. The two key SES indicatorsincome and education-may systematically moderate how a consumer responds to deep discount. High-income consumers may be generally less sensitive to prices and thus more sensitive to quality. High-educated consumers may be more sensitive to quality when they buy items on Groupon because they have better knowledge of the Groupon's practices and the tricks could be played by the merchants. As a results, discounts may seem less alluring to high-income and high-educated consumers.
To test this, we estimated the following specification:
where SES j is city j's income or education level. Note also that the main effect of SES is taken out by the city-fixed effects.
14 Estimates from this model are reported in Column 6 and 7 of Table 5 . Our quality concern arguments would predict that discount effect is more negative in geographic markets where consumers have higher average income and education. We indeed found such patterns in our data.
13 The results are similar if changing the value of the threshold to 200 or 400.
14 Moreover, we also only used U.S. deals in this regression because we only obtained income and education level data for U.S. cities.
Falsification and Robustness Checks
To further validate our findings, we next did a falsification exercise using the data on a sample of Groupon Goods deals we collected along with the main sample. Groupon
Goods is a online retailing channel launched in September 2011 and offers discounts on, e.g., home furnishing products and electronics (Reuters, 2011) . We expect consumers to have less worries or uncertainties about products featured in Groupon Goods because (i)
products from Groupon Goods can be largely viewed as search goods; and (ii) consumers deal directly with Groupon and Groupon gives consumers free return promises within 14 days of receipt.
15 Therefore, offering discounts on products in this channel should positively promote sales, at least not significantly hurt sales.
We obtained an analogous but substantially smaller (only 396 deals) sample of Groupon Goods deals, because Groupon Goods channel featured much less deals compared to the channel for local merchants. We followed the same procedure in culling the sales data as in the main sample, then we estimated a similar specification to Equation (1) based on this Groupon Goods sample (but Groupon Goods deals do not have as many attributes as the deals offered by local merchants). The estimates, reported in Table 4 , Column 6, indicate that discount percentage have a significant positive coefficient, 0.236 (p < 0.01), which is in sharp contrast with the negative effect of discount depth found before. This falsification test thus gives us more confidence in our quality concern explanation for why deeper discounts offered by local merchants may lead to less consumers to buy their products.
We also conducted several more robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of our results. We first estimated a linear specification (Table 6 , Column 1). We then estimated a specification with the square term of lag cumulative sales (Table 6 , Column 2) to allow more flexible forms of social influence and diffusion effect. We also fitted Equation (1) 15 For more details on Groupon's promise on this, see http://www.groupon.com/groupon-promise.
to a restricted data sample that discarded deals whose original price is below the 20th or above the 80th percentile (Table 6 , Column 3). This procedure could also help reduce unobserved product heterogeneity that is not captured by the specification in Equation (1) but related to product price. We also fitted Equation (1) to a restricted data sample that discarded deals whose duration time is below the 20th or above the 80th percentile (Table   6 , Column 4). Reassuringly, all the results largely remain consistent. One exception is that when we dropped the lag cumulative sales (Table 6 , Column 4), the discount depth's coefficient is not significant anymore but still negative signed. ** Table 6 . Robustness checks** Lastly, to see the implication of the limited number of lowly discounted deals, we split the sample at the 5th percentile of discount percentage. We then fitted Equation
(1) separately to each subsample. The results, reported in Column 6 and 7 in Table   6 respectively, indicate that discount effect in the lowly-discounted subsample becomes insignificant (although still has a negative sign), while the coefficient of discount estimated from the highly-discounted subsample is still highly significant and its magnitude increases substantially compared with the baseline estimate in Table 1 , Column 1. These results seem to suggest the negative influence of discount is probably mainly driven by deepdiscounted deals in our data and this finding may not apply when deals offers relatively lower discounts.
Implication and Conclusion
Previous research has generally agreed that "temporary retail price promotions cause a significant short-term sales spike ... this result is fundamental to virtually all research done in the area of promotions" (Blattberg et al., 1995, p. G123) . On the other hand, some researchers have found evidence of a long-term negative effect of price promotions, viz., a dip in sales after promotions in physical consumer package goods markets, which could be because of downward-adjusted reference price, stockpiling behavior, re-duced brand equity, etc. (Lattin and Bucklin, 1989; Mela et al., 1997 Mela et al., , 1998 Jedidi et al., 1999; Erdem et al., 2008) . Contrasting and also complementing with prior research in this stream, we suggest that the unique features of online daily-deal markets may render price promotions even carry an immediate (short-term) negative influence on product sales, viz., deterring consumer purchasing from the very beginning. This adds a novel and important insight to marketing managers when they plan promotion campaigns on experience/credence products, and/or in online distribution channels.
Evidently, the strategy of offering large discounts in the hope of catching consumers' eyes may actually hurt merchants' performance. 16 We, therefore, would advise lower discounts to merchants who are offering medium-to high-quality products or services.
For merchants who are offering credence goods, or who are located in a wealthier or moreeducated geographic market, such signaling effect is stronger and our advised strategy is more applicable.
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For owners of daily-deal websites, it might be beneficial for them to impose policies on the level of discounts allowed on their platforms. Lower discounts not only attract more deal purchases but also generate higher revenue to be split between the merchants and the platform owners.
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Moreover, it is crucial for the sites' owners to know the heterogeneity of featured merchants in terms of product quality and brand awareness whenever possible. Those merchants that are of fairly good product quality but with poor brand awareness should be the key clientele for daily-deal websites. 
